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REMARKS ON IN RE JONES'S SETTLEMENT.
In In re Jones's Settlement," Astbury J. held that a wife who
had the first life interest under her marriage settlement and
had for many years paid the premiums upon policies of insur-
ance on her husband's life comprised in the settlement, was 
not
entitled to a lien on the insurance moneys for the premiums 
so
paid. The policies and certain funds belonging to the wife
were settled in trust for the wife for life for her separate use,
and after her death in trust for the husband for life, and after
the termination of those interests in trust for the issue of 
the
marriage born during the lives of the husband and wife 
or
within 21 years after the survivor's death as they should jointly
appoint by deed with or without power of revocation and 
new
appointment or as the survivor should in like manner or 
by
will appoint, and in default of appointment in trust 
for the
1ED9'51 I Ch. 373.
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children of the marriage who should attain 21 or, in the case
of daughters, marry, in equal shares. The husband covenanted
with the trustees to pay the premiums and it was provided that
the trustees with the consent of the wife during her life and
afterwards at their discretion might apply any part of the income
or, if that was insufficient, any part of the principal in paying
the premiums. By a deed poll the husband and wife afterwards
appointed all the-trust property, subject to their own life inter-
ests, to their only child and daughter for her life for her
separate use, and after her death for her children born during
the lives of the appointors or the survivor or within 21 years
after the survivor's death who should attain 21 or, in the case
of daughters, marry, in equal shares, and a power of revocation
and new appointment was reserved to the appointors and the
survivor. The husband having no sufficient means to pay the
prdmiums, the wife paid them for 25 years to prevent the policies
from lapsing and without any arrangement with her husband
or the trustees. Upon the death of her husband the trustees
received the insurance moneys amounting to £3257, and the wife
claimed payment of £890 for premiums paid by her. She also
wrote to the trustees, with the concurrence of her daughter, who
had attained 21 and was unmarried, that, if she was not entitled
to such payment, she proposed to revoke the appointment and to
release her power of appointment, and that she and her daughter
would then direct payment out of the insurance moneys.
The judge decided that the wife's payments were voluntary
and that she was not entitled to recover them, resting his decision
upon In re Leslie,2 where Fry J. mentioned four cases (not
including this case) in which a lien might be created by payment
of premiums and added that "except under the circumstances
to which I have referred, no lien is created by the payment of
the premiums by a mere stranger or by a part owner." But
the Law Quarterly Review3 points out that in Strutt v. Tippett,4
Lindley L. J. doubted if the propositions stated by Fry J. in
that case were exhaustive, and suggests that the analogy of the
expenses incurred by a tenant for life in renewing leaseholds
might have been applied, referring to Jones v. Jones, and Brad-
223 Ch. D. 552, 560 (1883).
'July, 1915, vol. 31, P. 257.
'2 L. T. 475, 477 (i89o).
'5 Hare 440 (846).
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ford v. Brownjohn.6 Fry J. evidently did not consider that his
decision applied to such cases, for he mentioned the rule as
established that a tenant for life had a lien for expenses so
incurred, and said that he saw no analogy between the case
of a tenant for life and the case before him where no such
relation existed.1 The analogy was referred to in argument in
In re Jones's Settlement,8 and Astbury J. only remarked that
"the wife was not a life tenant in possession of these policy
moneys when she made these payments." But in Bradford v.
Brownjohn,9 the payments for renewal were made by a tenant
for life before his estate for life had come into possession, and
his rights were not affected by that circumstance. The trustees
in Jones's Settlement could not have used the income of the
trust premises for payment of the premiums without the wife's
consent, as they might have done in In re Waugh's Trusts,
0
which is referred to in a foot note. The wife was one of the
persons entitled successively to the benefit of the fund arising
from the policies, and there was no authority precluding her
from a claim on the fund for what she had paid in preserving
it for the benefit of all. She was not in the position of a junior
mortgagee who is only entitled to what is left after a prior
mortgage has been satisfied, as in Falcke v. Scottish Imperial
Insurance Co." Even in the latter case the Irish Couits managed
to give relief in In re Power's Policies.'
2
Another question in the case was whether the wife might
revoke the appointment so far as it gave any interest to the
daughter's children and then release the power of appointment,
so that, the entire interest being vested in her daughter subject
to her own life estate, the two might direct payment of the pre-
miums out of the trust moneys. It is settled that a special power
of appointment cannot be exercised by the donee for the purpose
of obtaining a benefit for himself, for, if he exercises the power,
he is bound to exercise it for the objects of the power, but, as
he is not bound to exercise it at all, this rule does not apply to
'L. R. 3 Ch. 711 (i868).
7 23 Ch. D. 565.
'[915] 1 Ch. pp. 376-377.
'L. R. 3 Ch. 71L
46 L. J. Ch. 629.
"34 Gh. D. 234.
1[1899] i I. R. 6.
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a release of the power.18 It was contended that a revocation
of an appointment stood on the same footing as a release of a
power. But the judge was quite clear that a power of revoca-
tion is fiduciary and must be exercised for the purposes of the
original power, and so decided that the wife could not revoke
the appointment for the purpose indicated. It does not appear,
however, why it was necessary to revoke any part of the
appointment in order to carry out what the wife and daughter
both desired. By the settlement the trust premises stood limited
in trust for the wife for life and after her death, in default
of appointment, for the daughter absolutely. By the appoint-
ment, subject to the wife's life interest, the daughter took an
estate for life, and after her death the property was limited
to her children born before the expiration of 21 years from
the death of her husband and wife who should attain 21, or, in
the case of daughters, marry. The class of grandchildren
intended to take under this appointment accordingly might not
be ascertained until 42 years after the death of the survivor
of the husband and wife, and the limitation to them seems
therefore to have been invalid for remoteness. The whole
beneficial interest would thus seem to be vested in the daughter
subject to her mother's life interest and power of appointment,
and, if the mother should release her power of appointment, there
would be no difficulty in carrying out the desired arrangement.
J. L. THORNDIKE.
THE TRANSFER OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER TO SECURE A PRE-
EXISTING DEBT AS CONSTITUTING THE TRANSFEREE
A HOLDER FOR VALUE IN NEW YORK
BY VIRTUE OF HIS LIEN.
Section 25 of the Negotiable Instruments Law enacts that
"value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and
is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or
at a future time."' The antecedent debt, however, to constitute
value in New York, must be extinguished; the provision does
not apply where an instrument was taken merely as collateral
for the pre-existing debt.
2
'lit re Somes, [1896] I Ch. 254.
'N. Y. Neg. Instr. Law, §5I.
'Sutherland v. Mead, 8o App. Div. io3 (19o3).
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The New York interpretation is, to be sure, not in accord with
the numerical weight of authority,
5 and is perhaps opposed to
the rule of the law merchant and the practical doctrines of
commercial convenience.4 But, on the other hand, the interpre-
tation is not opposed to the rules of commercial law as they have
been applied in New York, and is based on sound legal logic.
5
The second clause of §25 merely complements and explains the
first clause, since at strict common law the latter could not include
the former.
It is clear that, where a demand note was taken as collateral
for a pre-existing debt, there is great force in the holding of the
New York courts, that neither expressly nor infipliedly has the
transferee parted with value.6 Of course, where there is an
actual promise of forbearance, it is justly held that value is
given.7 It would seem that taking a time note as collateral for
an antecedent debt should be deemed giving value, in the form
of an implied promise not to sue until the time has run.
8 But
the New York courts refuse to break in on their rule with such
an implication.9
It is unfortunate, however, that the case of Sutherland v.
Mead, supra, was not worked out on the theory suggested by
Section 27 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: "Where the
holder has a lien on the instrument, arising either from contract
or by implication of law, he is deemed a holder for value to the
extent of his lien."' 0 The Court could thus have avoided the
anomalous state of the law on the point.
Security, whether an instrument or other property, given for
a debt, is merely a pledge, 1 creating a bailment for mutual
benefit, 2 and giving the pledgee a lien,'
5 even though the pledge
was collateral for an antecedent debt.'
4
'Morse on Banks and Banking, vol. 2, pp. 962.
"Norton on Bills and Notes, -§124; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. I (1842);
Railroad Company v. National Bank, IO2 U. S. 14 (i88o); Brewster v.
Schrader, 26 Misc. Rep. 480 (M899).
'Norton on Bills and Notes, §124.
'Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 392 (1895).
T Milius v. Kauffinann, io4 N. Y. 442 (19o5).
'Railroad Company v. National Bank, 1O2 U. S. 14, 25.
'Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 438 (1875).
" N. Y. Neg. Instr. Law, §53.
U 31 Cyc., 785, 786.
'Cutting v. Marlor, 78 N. Y. 454 (879); Preston v. Prather, 137
U. S. 604 (i89o).
"Munro v. Bonanno, 28 N. Y. S. 375 (1893).
"Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio 227 (1847).
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The proposition submitted is, therefore, that one who takes
a negotiable instrument as collateral for an antecedent debt is,
in New York, a holder for value pro tanto, by force of his lien,
independently of consideration of "value" as defined by §25 or
by the New York courts in construing that section. To hold
that he is not a holder for value under §27, it must be contended
that the pledgee does not acquire a lien when the consideration
was a past pledge.'0 But it may be doubted whether any con-
sideration is necessary in the creation of a lien in favor of the
pledgee, when actual possession is given him.1  However,
assuming that to be true, the Court of Appeals has justly held
that the existing debt is sufficient consideration for the transfer,
even tho it did not constitute "value" sufficient to cut off the
equity of an accommodation party.'
7
A banker has a general lien, implied by law, on his customer's
funds and securities, other than those deposited for a special
purpose, which he has in his possession at the time he claims a
balance due on a general account;"' and the appropriation of
such funds by the banker, in enforcement of his lien, is equiva-
lent to actual payment; so as to defeat the rights of third parties
to the money.10 Furthermore, a transfer of collateral for a
particular debt constitues the banker a pledgee of the collateral, 20
and gives him a lien which he can enforce only in regard to the
particular debt.21 And a deposit of collateral for debts due and
to become due, gives the banker a lien on the collateral to secure
such debts.
22
If the established rule in New York is as laid down in Suther-
land v. Mead, supra, it must, it is respectfully submitted, lead
to an absurdity. Suppose, for instance, that A transfers a third-
party note, to which an equity attaches, to his banker, B, to
is3 Cyc., 796.
"6Jones on Liens, vol. I, §4; Beale on Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 Harv.
Law Rev. 222; 9 Cyc., 362g.
' Grocers' Bank v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502 (1877).
"Morse on Banks and Banking, §§324, 331; Coats v. Donnell, 94
N. Y. 168 (1883); Heidelbach v. National Park Bank, 33 N. Y. S. 794
(895) ; Smith v. Eighth Ward National Bank, 52 N. Y. S. 290 (1898);
Magee on Banking, §269; Jones on Liens, vol. I, §244.
"Hatch v. National Bank, 147 N. Y. 184 (1895); Meyers v. N. Y'.
County National Bank, 36 App. Div. 482; London & R. P, Bank v.
Hanover National Bank, id., 487 (1899).
1o Wheeler v. Newbould, 16 N. Y. 392 (1857).
'Armstrong v. McLean, 153 N. Y. 490 (1897).
" Mechanics & Traders' Bank v. Livingston, 6 Misc. Rep. 8I (1893).
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secure all debts due and to become due, and A immediately,
becomes insolvent: B's general lien attaches at once, and, if he
chooses to rely on it, he can enforce it by set-off;23 but if he
claims on the note as transferee for value, he can not recover.
2 '
Or, suppose A deposits one note with B generally and another
note to secure a particular past debt, and A becomes insolvent
immediately: as to the first note, B has a lien which he can
enforce ;25 as to the second note, he is not a holder for value.
28
The net result is, that the banker who takes care to have his
customer agree particularly to his holding the instrument as
security, runs the risk of being declared not so meritorious a
transferee as the less careful banker.
If A delivers his instrument to his banker, B, for collection,
B has a lien on the instrument to secure all debts due and
payable.27 But he is not a holder for value.
28  And yet, by
§27, if he has a lien, he is "a holder for value to the extent of
his lien."
It is to be observed that Sutherland v. Mead was decided on
the construction of §25 "standing alone."29  It is submitted that
there is good ground, in reason and New York authority, for
holding that §27 complements §25; and that a New York banker,
or other transferee, who has taken a negotiable instrument as
collateral for an antecedent debt is "a holder for value to the
extent of his lien." 30
A. M.
See notes 18 and 19, supra.
Commercial Bank of Clyde v. Marine Bank, 37 How. Pr. Rep. 432
(1867); Spring Brook Chemical Co. v. Dunn, 39 App. Div. 13o (1899);
see also note 2, upra.
'See note 18, supra.
2See note 24, supra.
= Smith v. Eighth Ward National Bank, supra, n. 18.
See note 24, supra.
8o App. Div. lO3, iO7.
" Crawford, TheNeg. Instr. Law (3d ed.), pp. 41.
